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In the Netherlands a major part of preparedness plan-
ning for an epidemic or pandemic consists of maintaining 
essential public services, e.g., by the police, ﬁ  re  depart-
ments, army personnel, and healthcare workers. We pro-
vide estimates for peak demand for healthcare workers, 
factoring in healthcare worker absenteeism and using esti-
mates from published epidemiologic models on the expect-
ed evolution of pandemic inﬂ  uenza in relation to the impact 
on peak surge capacity of healthcare facilities and intensive 
care units (ICUs). Using various published scenarios, we 
estimate their effect in increasing the availability of health-
care workers for duty during a pandemic. We show that 
even during the peak of the pandemic, all patients requiring 
hospital and ICU admission can be served, including those 
who have non–inﬂ  uenza-related conditions. For this rigor-
ous task differentiation, clear hierarchical management, un-
ambiguous communication, and discipline are essential and 
we recommend informing and training non-ICU healthcare 
workers for duties in the ICU.
I
n the Netherlands a major part of preparedness planning 
for an epidemic or pandemic, e.g., avian inﬂ  uenza A, 
consists of maintaining essential services provided by the 
police, ﬁ  re departments, army personnel, and healthcare 
workers (HCWs). Even if an effective vaccine against avi-
an inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) would be available (1), preparation for 
a pandemic is still vital to maintain optimal care for acute-
care patients and those with inﬂ  uenza-like illness (ILI). The 
preparation for excess workloads among HCWs becomes 
even more important with the emergence of highly patho-
genic avian inﬂ  uenza strains.
We present a model to show the impact of the increased 
demand in HCWs with the increase in the number of hospi-
talized patients. We factor in the notion that the number of 
HCWs will be reduced because of increased absenteeism, 
which in turn affects the utilization of intensive-care beds 
and mechanical ventilation capacity. We present scenarios 
aiding in temporarily increasing the work force of HCWs 
in the intensive-care unit (ICU) environment using differ-
ent additive strategies. Because the surge capacity of inten-
sive-care resources is typically limited (2), we explore what 
training and preparation HCWs and managers at different 
levels will need to face the challenges posed by pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza.
Methods
Setting 
The University Medical Center Groningen (UMCG) 
is a tertiary-care university hospital covering ≈12% of 
the total Dutch population and ≈30% of the total surface 
area of the Netherlands. Under Dutch law, UMCG plays 
a dominant role in the region to organize and coordinate 
healthcare surge capacity during a catastrophe such as an 
avian inﬂ  uenza pandemic. With regional and municipal 
health authorities, general practitioners, and medical and 
managerial representatives of all 15 hospitals in the north-
ern Netherlands region, training courses were organized for 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza. These courses emphasized the need 
for enhanced collaboration, sharing of information, and 
communication. Part of this training course was the devel-
opment of an epidemiologic model to access the regional 
impact of a pandemic and the extent of possible prepara-
tions (3) at both managerial and medical domains.
Basic Model
We used FluSurge 2.0 (4) and a computer model in an 
Excel (Microsoft, Redmond, WA, USA) ﬁ  le developed by 
one of the authors to calculate the impact of an inﬂ  uenza 
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pandemic in the Netherlands on hospital admission and oc-
cupancy rate of all ICU beds (i.e., those with facilities for 
mechanical ventilation) (3,5). Data on population (slight-
ly >1.7 million) and age distribution were obtained from 
publicly available sources. Because age distribution in the 
Dutch population data was provided in blocks of 5 years, 
we converted these data to an even distribution to enable 
calculations with the FluSurge program (6). Data on total 
hospital beds, ICU beds, and number of nurses and their 
fulltime equivalents were obtained from publicly avail-
able sources (7). Information on ICU capacity was also 
obtained from reports from hospital administrators during 
the training sessions. These data on reported ICU capac-
ity were discussed during a semistructured telephone in-
terview with intensive-care specialists (usually anesthetists 
or internists) in August 2006. On the basis of these data, 
we estimated the regular bed capacity and maximal surge 
capacity. Numbers on the effects of pandemic inﬂ  uenza on 
healthcare services were adopted from the National Insti-
tute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) (5,8). 
RIVM presented tables for 25% and 50% disease attack 
rates (ARs) that represented best and worst case scenarios. 
From these tables, we calculated the 30% AR by linear 
transformation. A 30% AR is the most likely scenario ac-
cording to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
and RIVM. The AR was deﬁ  ned as the percentage of the 
population that became ill.
We also calculated within the model the total number 
of patients admitted to the hospitals at each point in time 
during the pandemic. We deﬁ  ned the ﬁ  rst day (day 0) as the 
moment the World Health Organization (WHO) declares 
effective human-to-human transmission (phase IV or V in 
the current WHO phase of pandemic alert). We assume the 
pandemic would reach the Netherlands ≈15 days after this 
ﬁ  rst conﬁ  rmed, effective human-to-human transmission.
We took into account the time each patient would oc-
cupy a hospital or ICU bed (range 8–15 days), based on 
experience with patients admitted to ICU with diagnoses 
of pneumonia or sepsis. Finally, we incorporated estimated 
risk for death per patient, a rate that in turn would reduce the 
number of admitted patients at any 1 time. Because RIVM 
data are in weekly blocks, we evenly distributed the num-
ber of hospital admissions and deaths during weekdays. 
We also factored in our calculations the effect of treatment 
(within 48 hours of infection) with antiviral medication on 
the spread and impact of the pandemic, although the exact 
effect size is still uncertain (6,9). Antiviral medication is 
assumed to reduce the total number of hospital admissions 
by 50% and death by ≈30%.
In the basic model we incorporated the probable ab-
senteeism of HCWs attributable to illness. We assumed 
that HCWs will become ill at a similar rate as the normal 
population. We used the total number of HCWs and linearly 
transformed the ratios of illness and death of the population 
over time on the HCW database. We focused our prepared-
ness plan on adults and assumed a pattern in the outbreak 
similar to that for Spanish ﬂ  u (10) and severe acute respira-
tory syndrome, in which adolescents and adults accounted 
for most patients.
Modeling Nursing Workload
We developed an extension to this model that showed 
the effects of increased demand in the HCW force because of 
an increased number of hospitalized patients with ILI. In this 
model, we factored in the notion that the number of available 
key HCWs (e.g., physicians, intensive-care nurses) would be 
reduced because of ILI absenteeism, which affects the use of 
ICU beds and mechanical ventilation capacity.
Furthermore, using different additive strategies re-
ported in the literature, we present several alternatives to 
increase the number of available HCWs. All 3 scenarios 
were adopted because of their inherent ease of use in daily 
hospital practice.
We used the basic model (3,5) for peak hospital and 
ICU occupancy rates during a pandemic of inﬂ  uenza. A 
major part of preparation encompasses clearing all 15 re-
gional hospitals of general surgical and medical patients, 
leaving  ≈30% of acute-care capacity for non–inﬂ  uenza-
related illness. In these 15 hospitals, the total ICU capacity 
is 200 beds. The predominant use of ICU beds in Europe is 
for postoperative care (instead of recovery rooms or post-
anesthesia special-care units) (11). Of these, 60 ICU beds 
(30%) need to be reserved for acute care for non–inﬂ  uenza-
related illness, leaving ≈140 ICU beds for inﬂ  uenza-related 
patients. The mean ICU length of stay for postoperative and 
general medical care patients is 3.4 (median 1 day, standard 
deviation [SD] 7.4) days. Therefore, it follows that ≈96% 
of these 140 ICU beds occupied by postoperative and gen-
eral medical care patients at the beginning of the pandemic 
can be made available within a 14-day period for patients 
ill from ﬂ  u. 
Even though we assume HCWs will become ill at the 
same rate as the general population, we also assume that 
morale and professionalism will be high and that undue 
absenteeism will not occur. That is, adherence to profes-
sional standards of HCWs reporting for duty will be high, 
although some unavailability of HCWs might be expected 
because of care duties within families or among neighbors 
who may become ill (12). This erosion has not been taken 
into account in the model we present.
To model the available number of HCWs in relation to 
the maximum number needed in a pandemic, we translated 
the peak ICU occupancy rate into a severity of illness and 
workload scoring system. A variety of validated scoring 
systems for patient severity and workload exist for use in 
the ICU environment and are widely used (13–18).
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We used data derived from the databases of the Europe-
an Research in Intensive Care Units (EURICUS) projects, a 
multicenter project designed to study the ICUs of the Euro-
pean Union (EU), to project severity of illness, diagnosis, 
and workload data in the ICU. A description of the methods, 
objectives, and results of these projects have been reported 
(11,15,19,20). These projects were developed from 1994 
through 2000 and included 137 ICUs from 14 different EU 
states with a total of 43,027 individual patient records and 
227,209 nursing days. Many study variables were analyzed, 
including age, diagnosis, length of stay, Simpliﬁ  ed Acute 
Physiology Score (SAPS-II) (14), Sequential Organ Dys-
function Score (SOFA-II ) (21), ICU mortality rate, hospital 
mortality rate, and Glasgow Coma Score. Part of this re-
search was the measurement of nursing workload in ICUs 
(15–17). Nursing workload per intensive-care patient was 
calculated by using the Nine Equivalents of Nursing Man-
power use score (NEMS) (16). NEMS is a therapeutic index 
to measure nursing workload at the ICU level. The use of 
NEMS has been developed and validated for multicenter 
ICU studies; management purposes in the general (macro) 
evaluation and comparison of workload at the ICU level; 
and prediction of workload and planning of nursing staff 
allocation at the individual patient level. NEMS correlates 
highly with all currently used severity of illness scoring sys-
tems such as Acute Physiology, Age, Chronic Health Evalu-
ation III, SAPS-II, and SOFA-II (16,20). The major advan-
tage of all these scoring systems is that they are an objective 
and reproducible measure of nursing workload related to the 
various activities performed in the ICU, without considering 
the appropriateness of standing policies of medical care.
We attributed scores on the basis of a speciﬁ  c diagnos-
tic category (13) to the corresponding NEMS points from 
the EURICUS projects database. We used the medical diag-
nostic category “bacterial/viral pneumonia” (diagnosis cat-
egory 15) as an indicator for nursing care requirements of 
ILI patients, as this closely matches the medical condition 
typical for inﬂ  uenza patients. Furthermore, we used the av-
erage NEMS points for all patients (minus the patients with 
diagnosis 15) in the EURICUS database as an indicator for 
the nursing workload necessary for the non-ILI acute-care 
patients. We modeled the available HCWs with a 30% AR, 
25% and 50% ICU admission rate, and mean length of stay 
of 8 days and 15 days without antiviral medication (AVM) 
(pandemic period 9 weeks) and 30% AR, 25% and 50% 
ICU admission rate, and mean length of stay of 8 days or 15 
days with AVM (pandemic period 14 weeks).
Scenarios
Scenario 1
Increasing the number of HCWs by expanding the 
work shift from 8 to 12 hours would increase the number of 
operational HCWs by ≈50%. The huge strain on personnel 
is justiﬁ  ed, when one considers the relatively short peak 
surge period, and we expect HCWs to comply.
Scenario 2
HCWs will become sick with ILI at the same rate as 
the general population. Lee and Chen (22) showed that 8 
weeks’ prophylactic use of neuraminidase inhibitors de-
creased peak absenteeism among HCWs from 10% to 2%. 
We translated this in our model by reducing the number of 
lost NEMS points (e.g., number of lost HCWs) by 80% for 
the entire pandemic period.
Scenario 3
In an international ICU workload study, Miranda et al. 
(17) showed that tasks performed in normal ICU environ-
ment by ICU nurses are only 30% dedicated to technical 
and speciﬁ  c ICU tasks for which ICU nurses are trained. 
This result means 70% of all tasks in ICU are regular nurs-
ing tasks performed daily in non-ICU, standard healthcare 
hospital environments. In this scenario, we mathematically 
decreased the number of NEMS points to be covered by 
ICU nurses to 30%. Non-ICU nurses and other hospital 
personnel (communication advisors, psychologists, physi-
cians, administrative staff, and the like) have to be prepared 
and trained to take over, for a relatively short period, the 
70% of nontechnical duties regularly performed by ICU 
nurses. We assume that there will be substantial numbers 
of HCWs in wards and ancillary facilities available because 
all hospitals involved will stop admitting postoperative care 
and non–inﬂ  uenza-related medical patients when WHO de-
clares the pandemic alert. This will free ≈70% of all HCWs 
in the 15 hospitals.
Scenario 4
Finally, we combined the effects of all 3 scenarios in 
an overall model of available HCWs. This ﬁ  nal model gives 
the opportunity to study the effect of 3 easy-to-implement 
scenarios.
Results
The Table shows the result of our baseline calculations. 
For the 30% non-ILI acute-care patients, we attributed 24.8 
(SD 9.9) mean NEMS points; for the ILI patients, we at-
tributed 28.6 (SD 9.8) mean NEMS points. We assume that 
an ICU nurse can deliver 46.3 NEMS points in 24 hours. 
Because HCWs will become ill as the population does, the 
number of NEMS points available will be reduced as the 
pandemic period progresses; the lowest number will occur 
at 28 days, when the pandemic period is assumed to be at its 
highest point (online Appendix Table 1, available from www.
cdc.gov/EID/content/14/10/1518-appT1.htm). The lowest 
number of NEMS points will occur at day 43, when AVM 
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is available for the population (online Appendix Table 2, 
available from www.cdc.gov/EID/content/14/10/1518-
appT2.htm). As can be seen from both online Appendix 
Tables, HCW shortage will occur if the ICU admission rate 
increases to 50% (mean length of stay 8 days or 15 days 
without AVM). However, if AVM is available, no HCW 
shortage will occur, under the premises that all general 
medicine and surgery have been temporarily stopped.
Scenarios
Scenario 1
In Figure 1, panels A and B, the results are given for 
the model length of stay of 15 days, with 25% and 50% ICU 
admission rates with and without AVM. Even in the worst 
case scenario, a 15-day length of stay without availability 
of AVM for the individual patient (Figure 1, panel A), no 
staff shortage appears. The models for a length of stay of 8 
days, 25% and 50% ICU admission with and without AVM 
(not shown), show no staff shortage over time.
Scenario 2
If the number of HCWs who become ill from ILI is 
reduced by 80%, a similar increase of deliverable NEMS 
points is achieved. This increase is irrespective of the num-
ber of patients admitted to the hospital and ICU. In Figure 
2, panels A and B, results are given for the models with a 
15-day length of stay, 25% and 50% ICU admission rate, 
with and without AVM. In this model, the effect of poten-
tial HCW staff shortage is most profound at a 50% ICU 
admission rate. Even decreasing the number of ill HCWs 
because of 8 weeks’ prophylactic use of neuraminidase in-
hibitors (22) does not solve staff shortage when it is most 
needed.
Scenario 3
Transfer of tasks to other HCWs than ICU nurses de-
creases the number of NEMS points needed by 70%. We 
assume acute-care and ILI patients admitted to the ICU will 
require the 30% technical ICU-related work of ICU nurses. 
This decrease in the number of NEMS points needed has a 
direct effect on the necessary workload in the different AR 
and length-of-stay models. Figure 3, panels A and B, shows 
that decreasing the number of required NEMS in the ICU 
results in sufﬁ  cient numbers of HCWs being available for 
care of ILI patients.
Scenario 4
We combined all 3 scenarios to access the impact of 
the 3 relatively easy to implement scenarios on HCW avail-
ability. Figure 4, panels A and B, shows the effects of all 3 
scenarios on the NEMS points availability.
Discussion
We provide calculations, which incorporate HCW ab-
senteeism, for the surge capacity in HCWs in case of an 
inﬂ  uenza pandemic. In our model, we have shown that 
business continuity is maintainable when strict, clear, and 
disciplined hierarchical structures are in place.
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Table. Study population characteristics from EURICUS projects* 
Characteristic
Study 
population
Diagnosis
category 15† 
Total no.  39,158 1,413
ICU length of stay, mean (SD)  5.2 (10.4)  10.5 (13) 
Age, no. (%)  59.3 (19.8)  57.7 (21.8) 
SAPS-II, no. (%)  31.9 (17.8)  39.5 (18.8) 
NEMS, no. (%)  24.8 (9.9)  28.6 (9.8) 
ICU deaths, %  13 27
Overall deaths, %  19 36
*ICU, intensive care unit; SAPS, Simplified Acute Physiology Score; 
NEMS, Nine Equivalents of Nursing Manpower use score.  
†Values are given as mean (SD). 
Figure 1. A) Amount of Nine Equivalents of Nursing Manpower use 
(NEMS) points needed and available by 25% and 50% admission 
rate in the intensive care unit (ICU) scenario 1, expanding healthcare 
worker (HCW) work hours from 8 to 12 h per 24 h (pandemic period 
9 wk). B) Amount of NEMS points needed and available by 25% 
and 50% admission rate in ICU scenario 1, expanding HCW work 
hours from 8 to 12 h per 24 h (pandemic period 14 wk).RESEARCH
Recommendation 1
Start preparations in time. When WHO declares phase 
IV, stop admitting all general patients, clear hospital beds, 
and free up HCWs. If hospitals are not cleared from re-
sponsibility for postoperative and general medical patients 
and if admitting general patients is not stopped, not only 
will there not be enough hospital and ICU beds available 
for ILI patients but also unnecessary risk for exposure to 
ILI will be placed on these patients. This step is mandatory 
in all hospital preparedness planning.
Recommendation 2
Implement a simple nursing workload measurement 
system for scarce resources. This will provide valuable in-
formation on the current workload and will aid in planning 
for a pandemic (23–26).
Recommendation 3
Gain insight, per hospital, about general and acute-
care populations. This will provide information about the 
number of hospital and ICU beds and the number of HCWs 
capable of being cleared for work with ILI patients.
Length of stay for individual ICU patients is the pre-
dominant factor in capacity planning for a pandemic. We 
show in our results, for a worst case scenario of patients 
kept in ICU for 15 days, that demand for workload and 
ICU beds exceeds capacity (3). Reducing the length of stay 
of some patients will increase the capability of hospitals 
to serve most ILI patients. Therefore, we propose that a 
strong distinction be made between cure and care. During 
a pandemic, elderly patients with severe co-existing condi-
tions may opt for supportive care without hospital and/or 
ICU admission, in consultation with their loved ones and 
their general practitioners. These patients may die because 
of ILI.
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Figure 2. A) Amount of Nine Equivalents of Nursing Manpower use 
(NEMS) points needed and available by 25% and 50% admission 
rate in the intensive care unit (ICU) scenario 2, healthcare worker 
(HCW) 8 wk prophylactic use of neuraminidase inhibitors (pandemic 
period 9 wk). B) Amount of NEMS points needed and available by 
25% and 50% admission rate in the ICU scenario 2, HCW 8 wk 
prophylactic use of neuraminidase inhibitors (pandemic period 
14 wk).
Figure 3. A) Amount of Nine Equivalents of Nursing Manpower use 
(NEMS) points needed and available by 25% and 50% admission 
rate in intensive-care unit (ICU) scenario 3, task differentiation in 
healthcare workers (HCWs) (pandemic period 9 wk). B) Amount 
of NEMS points needed and available by 25% and 50% admission 
rate in ICU scenario 3, task differentiation in HCWs (pandemic 
period 14 wk). Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza and Excess Hospital Workload
The smallest gain in available NEMS points oc-
curred with scenario 2, i.e., 8 weeks’ prophylactic use of 
neuraminidase inhibitors for HCWs. Although prophylac-
tic use of neuraminidase inhibitors serves an import role 
in staff protection (27) and will most likely enhance HCW 
compliance, it serves its role speciﬁ  cally at the individual 
HCW level instead of at the workload level. The largest 
effect on availability of NEMS points is with scenario 3. 
Through insight about workload of ICU nurses and other 
HCWs, rigorous task differentiation can be obtained, and 
even speciﬁ  c tasks can be delegated to non-HCW special-
ists (for example, communication with family members of 
deceased patients can be done by hospital spokespersons 
and communications experts).
Furthermore, if all general medical and surgical pa-
tients are cleared from all hospitals in the northern part of 
the Netherlands, 932 medical specialists (anesthesiologists, 
surgeons, internal medicine, cardiologists, and cardiotho-
racic surgeons) can be used to provide care for acute-care 
and inﬂ  uenza patients. This strategy would greatly enhance 
the number of HCWs for pandemic inﬂ  uenza per hospital.
Finally, UMCG has 2,470 undergraduate and gradu-
ate medical students, 367 dentistry students, and 423 stu-
dents’ behavioral and social sciences in 2006. There are 
also 1,240 nursing science students and 2,391 health sci-
ence students at the Hanze University Groningen of Ap-
plied Sciences. If indeed 44.3% (28) (226 of 510 medical 
students) of healthcare-related students were to report for 
duty in case of a HCW shortage, 3,053 extra HCWs could 
be recruited for duty during a pandemic to ﬁ  ll the potential 
gaps in healthcare delivery. These students would be dis-
tributed among all 15 hospitals in the region, giving each 
≈203 extra HCWs.
There are several limitations to our analysis. The re-
port by the Writing Committee of the Second World Health 
Organization Consultation on Clinical Aspects of Human 
Infection with Avian Inﬂ  uenza (29) prompts us to discuss 
the impact these ﬁ  ndings have on preparedness planning of 
healthcare organizations. The case-fatality rate of 61% in 
total, especially among persons 10 to 19 years of age, and 
the much lower rate in persons >50 years of age are dif-
ferent from the reported rates of past pandemics (30–32). 
This increased case-fatality rate in the 10- to 19-year age 
group will have a tremendous effect on pandemic prepared-
ness planning and the model presented here for hospital 
and healthcare institutions. Until now, we assumed persons 
10–19 years of age made up only a small percentage of po-
tential hospitalized persons (3). The question that has not 
been answered by the Writing Committee is whether this 
age group’s particular risk is because this age group is main-
ly responsible for handling poultry and poultry products in 
reports on avian inﬂ  uenza. In the Netherlands, there are ≈2 
million persons (12%) in this age category among the coun-
try’s 16.4 million inhabitants. The same proportion holds 
for the 27 countries of the European Union (494 million in-
habitants, 57 million persons 10–19 years of age [11.7%]).
In afﬂ  uent countries, preparation for a pandemic is 
mostly supported and ﬁ  nanced at the national level, and 
the overall belief is that hospital and intensive-care capac-
ity will sufﬁ  ce. Less afﬂ  uent countries might have more 
difﬁ  culties with pandemic preparation. The Writing Com-
mittee does not provide guidelines for preparation. For 
afﬂ  uent countries, the economic ramiﬁ  cations of “losing” 
the younger generation struck by avian inﬂ  uenza might be 
even more dramatic then a pandemic itself because afﬂ  uent 
countries are dealing with an increasing older population 
and lower birth rates.
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Figure 4. A) Amount of Nine Equivalents of Nursing Manpower use 
(NEMS) points needed and available by 25% and 50% admission 
rate in intensive care unit (ICU) scenarios 1, 2, and 3, combined 
effect of all 3 scenarios (pandemic period 9 wk). B: Amount of 
NEMS points needed and available by 25% and 50% admission 
rate in ICU scenario 1, 2, and 3, combined effect of all 3 scenarios 
(pandemic period 14 wk)RESEARCH
The model used also has several limitations. The data-
sets of the EURICUS projects were constructed almost a 
decade ago. Because of changes in ICU technology and ICU 
nursing, decreasing emphasis on technical procedures, in-
creased emphasis on communication within the ICU team, 
and communication with the patients’ relatives and loved 
ones, some variables like NEMS (change in workload), 
length of stay, and ICU mortality rate (change in technical 
procedures) may have changed. We expect that our model 
presents a worst-case scenario for workload. In addition, 
our basic model is based on incomplete and sometimes 
conﬂ  icting or inconsistent information on the effects of an 
inﬂ  uenza pandemic. We assume that more reliable data will 
only become available in the early stages of a pandemic.
Rigorous task differentiation, clear hierarchical man-
agement, unambiguous communication, and discipline are 
essential. We recommend informing and training non-ICU 
HCWs for possible duties at the ICU. Training should ad-
dress HCW needs as well as those of family and loved ones 
of patients with ILI admitted to the ICU. It should also in-
corporate the potential difﬁ  culties for HCWs in communi-
cating with family members and loved ones if patients die 
after intensiﬁ  ed treatment decisions (3,33,34).
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